When smaller allies make big impressions
Axios reported that President Donald Trump phoned Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, swore at him, and accused him of ingratitude over threats to bomb Beirut – action that could derail US–Iran peace talks and breach a local ceasefire. A US-brokered ceasefire between Israel and Lebanon has reportedly been agreed in principle this week, but recent history suggests hostilities may yet continue.
A common assumption is that the United States dictates policy to its smaller allies, expecting compliance. In practice, this is often not the case. Smaller “client states” frequently pursue their own local political objectives, irrespective of their principal ally. Israel’s conduct in Lebanon illustrates this dynamic. While its immediate priorities are clear, the alignment between its tactical actions and longer-term strategy is less so.
Israel is not unique in this regard. Taiwan provides a useful historical parallel. Although located roughly 160 km from China’s mainland, Taiwan’s Kinmen Islands lie just 2 km offshore. During the Cold War, these islands became a sensitive flashpoint, partly due to provocative actions from Taipei. Among the most striking examples was the concrete Beishan Broadcasting Wall, which blasted propaganda towards the mainland.
On a good day, the broadcasts could be heard up to 25 km away, though this achieved little but irritating and provoking the Chinese. Taiwan also deployed balloons and artillery shells carrying propaganda leaflets. The United States, for its part, had little interest in provoking Beijing, yet Taiwan pursued its own agenda regardless.
The Beishan Broadcasting Wall captures a broader paradox of alliances: a smaller state, protected by a superpower, retaining the agency to act independently despite its patron’s preferences.
In Israel’s case, reliance on American military and diplomatic support has not precluded unilateral action in Lebanon, including steps that risk undermining US diplomatic efforts. This divergence is particularly evident as Washington seeks some form of accommodation with Iran.
From Israel’s perspective, any US-Iran agreement that falls short of materially constraining Iran’s nuclear and missile capabilities would be politically contentious. Domestic pressure for decisive outcomes against regional adversaries remains strong.
The domestic dimension is critical. Prime Minister Netanyahu faces elections no later than October 2026 and must demonstrate tangible security gains. As one opposition figure put it, nearly three years after October 7th, Hamas remains in Gaza and Hezbollah remains in Lebanon – and instead of dealing with an 86-year-old Ali Khamenei in Iran, Israel is now still dealing with Ali Khamenei.
As the prospects of a US–Iran deal increase, so too may Netanyahu’s willingness to accept risk elsewhere. With direct action against Iran constrained, Lebanon has become the principal theatre for demonstrating resolve, particularly through operations targeting Hezbollah.
In some respects, the ongoing US-Iran stand-off may even serve Netanyahu’s near-term interests, buying time to pursue a visible security outcome in Lebanon. Under US pressure, Israel has refrained from striking Beirut directly. However, Israeli forces have advanced into southern Lebanon to deter rocket attacks and degrade Hezbollah infrastructure. These operations have not eliminated the threat and have exposed troops to increasingly effective attacks, including first-person-view drone strikes.
The deeper such incursions extend, the greater the potential for casualties, and the accompanying political costs. The historical record offers a cautionary precedent: the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, which failed to deliver lasting security and contributed indirectly to Hezbollah’s emergence.
That lesson appears only partially absorbed. Current operations risk being driven more by immediate political imperatives than by clearly defined, achievable strategic objectives. In that respect, they resemble the Beishan Broadcasting Wall: highly visible, provocative, and of limited strategic effect.
The broader lesson is that alliances rarely eliminate divergence. Even where strategic alignment exists, smaller partners retain both the capacity and the incentive to pursue their own objectives. The tragedy in Lebanon is that it is once again the arena for a conflict shaped by misaligned priorities. Without a coherent, shared strategy between allies, the result risks being as loud and attention-grabbing as the Beishan Wall – yet ultimately just as futile, and far more costly.
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